Category Archives: One Tribe At A Time

One Tribe At A Time #10: A Report from embedded journalist Andrew Lubin

By Steven Pressfield | Published: December 7, 2009

[We'll be hearing again from Maj. Jim Gant in three weeks, but for this Monday and the next, I'm very pleased and honored to feature a "report from the trenches" from independent foreign correspondent Andrew Lubin, who has just returned from six weeks in Afghanistan where he was embedded with Army and Marine troops. Mr. Lubin's son Phil is a Marine artilleryman; Andy loves the troops; nothing gives him greater pleasure than to get out there in the tall cane with young Marines and soldiers and come back with the straight, unfiltered scoop. This recent trip is his 10th to Iraq, Afghanistan and Beirut. Andy's work appears regularly in Jane's Intelligence Review, Leatherneck and Proceedings. He is the author of the award-winning book, Charlie Battery: A Marine Artillery Battery in Iraq.]

Success Starts in the Villages

By Andrew Lubin

It’s more than just numbers of troops, it’s getting them off the Forward Operating Bases

Shopkeepers in Nawa greet Marines

The recent debate over troop strength is finally over; President Obama is sending 30,000 Marines and soldiers to bolster the 21,000 he added in March. As before, the Marine Corps will be leading the charge; 1^st Bn, 6^th Marines (infantry) will heading out in the next weeks, and the 1^st Marine Expeditionary Force will join them in the following months. The Army is sending three brigades, along with 7,000 headquarters troops.

Are the 34,000 enough? Too little? Too many? That question is best answered by defining the troops’ mission and how it is expected to be accomplished. Judging by the results of the Marine efforts in Helmand and Nimroz Provinces, the real issue is not one of troop strength, but rather one of how those troops are utilized once they’re on the ground.

“It’s really very simple,” Col. Dale Alford said at the recent Marine Corps University Counterinsurgency Symposium in Washington, D.C, “we want to make them pick our side.” Alford is correct; for all the different theories on counterinsurgency (COIN) from “oilspots” to “trickle down” to “governance,” American and NATO success in Afghanistan depends on the farmers and laborers in the countryside believing that “our way” is more beneficial to them and their families than what the Taliban offers.

ISAF commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal knows that the Coalition needs the cooperation of the locals, regardless of how many troops are in-country. “The key to success,” he wrote to Sectretary of Defense Robert Gates, “will be strong personal relationships forged between security forces and local populations.” These relationships are not hard to initiate; Afghanistan’s Pashtunwali code of hospitality and honor lends itself to the tribesmen wanting good relationships with the Marines and soldiers–but the troops need to get off those FOB’s and meet the people.

Capt. Brian Huysman, Charlie Co., 1st Bn., 5th Marines, sharing a chai with local villagers

Down in Helmand Province, Marines of the 2^nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade are meeting the people. On the morning of 2 July, Afghan citizens and Taliban along the Helmand River Valley found 4,000 Marines had flown through the night and were on the ground, patrolling through their villages, engaging the bad guys and establishing multiple new bases. “We go out to where the people are,” 2MEB commanding officer Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson said. “We don’t drive to work; we walk to work.”

This was the first time many of the villagers had seen Coalition forces, and they are responding positively to the Marine efforts. In Nawa, C Company, 1^st Bn, 5^th Marines was attacked by the Taliban within hours of its arrival–and responded by driving the enemy back where they came from. “The bad guys weren’t used to Marines,” explained 1^st Sgt David Wilson. “We pursued them, we didn’t break contact, we hunted them down and we shot them–and in 10 days the area was secure.”

The first sign of successful “COIN” is when the local citizenry realizes that cooperating with Coalition troops improves their lives, and Charlie Company’s killing or driving the Taliban out of Nawa was an important first step. The next step was to build relationships with the locals, and to do that, the Marines went out on patrol two and three times daily. Showing up again and again in Nawa and the outlying villages, the Marines talked with shop owners, the money lender, farmers, children, the local Mullah, and everyone who would talk with them. In addition to becoming a familiar part of the landscape, their continued presence enabled them to ask questions as they bought small amounts of sodas, fruits, and vegetables from the shop owners: “What is the biggest problem facing your village? How would you solve it? Do your children go to school? Do you work?” Gathering this sort of intelligence, plus identifying key leaders and people of influence, enables the Marines along with Civil Affairs and USAID teams to sit with the village elders and address the issues of jobs and governance that will make Nawa a successful district again.

Listening to the villagers helps the Marines understand what sort of jobs are required to make the area viable. As opposed to the big dollar projects ISAF touts, the Marines now have 260+ locals earning $5.00/day cleaning the irrigation canals–and with these canals now flowing freely, the locals are growing grapes, wheat and corn instead of opium.

But none of this would be happening if the Marines weren’t out patrolling, which is why recent comments from the Pentagon are worrisome. Concerns were raised that more big FOB’s need to be built before more soldiers are dispatched, that the soldiers need more chow halls, MRW shops, and hardened bunks with wireless internet. This is wrong; the troops need to live and work with their Afghan partners, abandon their MRAPs [heavily armored vehicles] and walk through the villages meeting those local citizens who are looking to be their friends. If you don’t get out and work with the locals and instead simply patrol from inside an MRAP, it makes no difference how many troops Mr. Obama dispatches.

Next week: It’s “Clear-Hold-Build-Transition” – Training the ANA

Also posted in Afghanistan, Guest Blogger | 14 Comments

One Tribe At A Time #9: My Back Pages

By Steven Pressfield | Published: November 30, 2009

[Some of the smartest and most interesting input we've received on this blog has come from the Comments section. Alas, such contributions often go unnoticed, buried as they are in the "back pages." In an attempt to rectify this, I'd like to present here on the front page a very insightful response to Maj. Jim Gant's paper, "One Tribe At A Time," from former infantry platoon leader and Brigade Intelligence Officer Jim Gourley--along with a reply-in-depth from Maj. Gant. This is long, but worth it. I've edited the piece lightly for acronyms and so forth.]

Dear Maj. Gant,

I’ve read your paper, “One Tribe At a Time.” I appreciate your viewpoint from the foxhole of a decorated warrior who’s been “out in the fecal matter” and slogged through some of the worst combat action possible with your tribal brothers. However, there are a few points I’d like to challenge you on from the viewpoint of a former Infantry PL turned Brigade Intel Officer. Please consider this as loyal opposition, and only until I’m convinced by your presentation, at such time I’ll be a loyal ally.

To begin, I will state a few of my preconceived notions.

1) We’ll never get the central government of Afghanistan to function such that it can reasonably provide for the common defense, insure domestic tranquility, or establish justice. There will never be a sheriff in Afghanistan. Our best bet is to make sure all the gunfighters and horse thieves maintain parity.

2) We can never overcome the Afghan perception that they will outlast us, because even our new strategies still maintain getting out as the ultimate goal.

3) As Al Qaeda continues to franchise itself across Southeast Asia and into Africa, the relative importance of Afghanistan diminishes, especially with regard to securing the United States against terrorist attacks.

With that said, I’ll begin. I immediately and whole-heartedly agree with you on the streamlining of the planning process, the need for “one call” philosophy of team support, and the change of Rules of Engagement. However, the consequence I envision of this is the creation of a relationship between the fielded teams and the supporting higher headquarters that will become immediately and irrevocably adversarial.

Teams would act virtually autonomously, be highly susceptible to suspicion of the headquarters and thus encouraged to be uncommunicative. Simultaneously, headquarters would lose information, have a poor field of vision on the battlefield, and be handicapped in its efforts to provide teams the instantaneous support that is needed. Meanwhile, the headquarters must maintain its own non-Tribal Engagement Team forces in order to accomplish other missions. How can a headquarters keep its battlespace coordinated when so many elements are “cut loose” from it? I understand that the tribes don’t come to OPORD briefings at Corps as it is, but I’ve been in more than one situation where Special Operations Forces refused to cooperate or share information with a battlespace owner, and there’s no denying that there have been SOF SNAFUs in the past which caused local socio-political fallout. It’s hard to blame the man with the stars on his collar for being nervous when he’s going to be the one left holding the bag. What’s the balance between autonomy and accountability?

I cannot disagree with you more on the risk-averse nature argument. Our armed forces will always go back for our fallen, we will never leave a man behind. For that very reason, a TET left flapping in a firefight will always take priority. That means an extraordinary investment of time, resources, and additional risk. If this aspect of the tactical situation is critical to your strategy, I can’t see it succeeding. Is it possible to work around this?

I draw a problematic connection between finding qualified officers and NCOs for the TETs, allowing the teams to “go tribal”, and the level of trust and power given to a team. Not without a little humor, I believe what you’re advocating is the creation of three new Special Forces Divisions. I think you’re asking for a group of men with a kind of stamina, quick thinking, patience and maturity found only in SOF and on a Space Shuttle. There haven’t been that many astronauts in our nation’s history, and the problems of the 18X program in “growing” more SF soldiers are well documented. You’ve been extremely successful in your endeavors. One could almost characterize you as “Lawrence of Arabia for the 21st Century”. Certainly it must be recognized that you’re a special individual. But if everyone had the same capabilities we wouldn’t think of you as special, and we’d probably have our TETs. My question is whether you believe there are enough individuals with your level of qualifications and potential out there, and whether we can entice enough of them to the TETs to make this work?

I will lastly posit this question to you. If the fundamental consideration of the tribes is how they will continue to secure their safety and prosperity for the long-term, how can the TET concept compete with the Taliban/Al Qaeda strategy of omnipresent threat? As Bin Laden said, “People follow a strong horse.” If even in the long term of our strategy we’re able to assist the Afghans in their security, how can we ever really overcome the temptation of joining the Taliban if the Afghan population, as they certainly realize they must, is on the lookout for their safety in the long-term? I wonder, in (correctly) asserting that we can’t totally eradicate the Taliban, do we throw the baby out with the bathwater? We can’t “kill ‘em all”, but is there a valuable Psyop/Civil Affairs message projected by killing enough of them? Do we prove ourselves to be the strong horse? I hardly doubt such a strategy would be MORE effective than TETs, but I wonder if you feel a parallel effort would be a force multiplier or even as effective.

Thanks for your time. Best of luck to you in your travels and to Mr. Pressfield in nurturing further discussion.

Regards,
Jim Gourley

Dear Jim,

Thank you very much for reading the blog and posting. You have more than earned the right to voice your opinion and disagree with me. I respect your viewpoint more than you know, and I bet when the dust clears we are closer to one another than either of us would like to admit. So … a “preface” before I address your points.

As I said in the paper, I do not have all the answers. I have some good experience in Afghanistan working with a tribe, backed by some research and a good basic understanding of COIN and unconventional warfare (UW). I have a God-given gift of being able to “build relationships” with indigenous fighters–as do many, many others. I love both the Iraqi and the Afghan people and culture. I used that and incorporated what I had learned in Iraq as a combat advisor and my time spent out at Robin Sage (the unconventional warfare portion of Special Forces training) to try and verbalize and put together a model for success at the tactical level when dealing with a tribe in Afghanistan. (Note here: If one does not believe that the tribes play a key central role in Afghanistan, then the Tribal Engagement premise is not worth considering. However, I believe it is the critical factor and the one variable that we have to positively influence to succeed. Getting the tribes on our side will not ensure ‘success’ but not getting them on our side will ensure defeat).

Now, I also said that what works with one tribe, in one area, with one team, may not work with the next tribe or even the next team. What worked in ‘03 may not work in ‘09. Does that mean that I am backing off of my premise? Not at all. If anything, it has become even stronger over the last few weeks as the popularity of the blog and paper has forced me to answer some very tough, very good questions – like the ones you have asked. The tactical tribal engagement (TTE) that I wrote about through the use of tribal engagement teams (TETs) and the larger, overall tribal engagement strategy (TES) supports another aspect of what I believe to be true. We have to deal with the overall problems that we are facing in Afghanistan from the lowest level possible for further improvements along several different lines of operation, such as, security, infrastructure development, governance, etc. But what do we do for instance with “good governance?” The tribes have good governance within the tribe. Ask them. What do they gain by accepting a central government that can do little to help them? Do we all believe that the Afghan central government is corrupt? If we do, how does that make us look when we support that government and try to push it off onto the tribes? Does the central government need the tribes? Do the Taliban? Do the tribes need the Taliban? Do we need the tribes? Do the tribes need us?

One last point before I answer each question. I believe that when you say “Afghan people” what most people mean is “Afghan tribesmen.” Break it down further. When you say “Afghan tribesman,” you’re really saying “Pashtun tribesman”. Afghanistan will not be ruled/governed/lead by anyone other than a Pashtun. I believe that to be true. Does that mean we don’t deal with the Hazaras, the Uzbeks or the Tajiks? No, of course not. We just have to do it differently.

So, here we go:

1) I agree that the GIRoA will never look what we want it to look like. I agree that whatever model we use for “success” cannot be one that we develop or one that we can even completely envision right now. I do however, believe this: They have to have some type of system that allows them to have a “face” to the rest of the world. Someone who represents Afghanistan to the rest of the world and secondly, the tribes will play a major role in this hybrid form of government. What will the government of Afghanistan look like if the Taliban prevail? Will there be a “leader”? Will he be accepted by the rest of the Afghans? The rest of the world? Will there be another civil war? Will we support another Northern Alliance-type of resistance or insurgency? So, I agree with you. The current Afghan government is not our “horse” for establishing a western-style government. Looking back at historical boundaries of empires that spanned Afghanistan, before there was an Afghanistan, we have had successful confederations of tribes that allowed for governance and justice. Up until the Soviets, this trend continued. With the tribes functioning in Afghanistan, I think we would be surprised at what would come out in the form of security, justice, and governance.

2) I will take this a step further and say we will never outlast the Afghans because we can’t. We do not have the same type of make-up as individuals. Time is on their side and when I say that, I mean for both the Taliban and the Afghan people. They are in no hurry. They can and will endure hardships that we cannot even imagine. Just as importantly, they know we can’t outlast them. So again, I agree with you. However, TETs never leave so it has a different goal. The US, or any fully developed nation for that matter, never fully leaves an area that it has had a military presence. Operations continue and relationships are maintained long after major combat operations are over.

3) That is a very good point. However, I believe that right now and for the foreseeable future that the south and east portions of Afghanistan are of strategic importance to al-Qaeda because this area acts as a buffer for the FATA and NWFP regions of Pakistan. Why is this important? I believe that the FATA and the NWFP regions are currently the only locations on earth where al-Qaeda must maintain physical control of to be effective. Who provides al-Qaeda their safe-haven within these areas? Tribes. It is through building lasting, true relationships with the tribes in the southern and eastern portions of Afghanistan that we will be able to influence what is happening on the ground in Pakistan. Unless of course we are willing to say that we will, at some point, invade these regions with combat forces. Does Afghanistan lose strategic importance over time? Maybe. Does the “Pashtunistan” region? I don’t believe so. I believe other regions become more important, but that does not mean that this region becomes less important.

Now to your doubts and objections:

A. Your first major concern is not only valid, but has a much more important impact than just this war and this scenario. It goes to a deep-rooted paradigm that both Special Operations forces and general purpose forces must deal with better. Has it gotten better? I know that in my time on the ground in Afghanistan, I had no issues. However, at that time, SOF owned the ground, so of course it was easy – for me. I haven’t been to Afghanistan since the change in command and control, since there are battle space owners (BSO), etc…I do know this however: That battle space owner wants to win his part of the war. That TET team leader wants to win his part of the war. As a TET team leader, I would be just as concerned with establishing rapport with that BSO as I would be with the tribal chief. The TET could not, and would not be successful without the BSO not only knowing, but supporting what the TET was doing and vice versa. I would not as a TET leader run around half-cocked all the time, doing things that I knew were outside of the intent of what higher general command, the Battle Space Owner, was trying to accomplish.

I would spend as much time as necessary prior to infil, planning and coordinating my efforts with his. If I can’t do that, then I can’t be successful. Period. A TET cannot go into an area where they are not wanted or needed by the BSO. This would go back to the initial planning stages. I would totally incorporate my plan into his. Now, would there have to be some type of give and take? Yes, of course. I would have an “OP Box” of some sort where I would have to be given notice of operations that were being conducted and of course I would inform the BSO if I ever left that “OP Box”. I would share all relevant information with him and help answer his PIR. I would support his mission accomplishment. I would facilitate his plan in my “OP Box”. To do anything less than that on both sides (the TET and the BSO) would be criminal. Will there be issues? Of course. Will there be TETs that will be difficult to work with? More than likely. Will there be BSO that don’t want to work with TETs no matter how much they could help them? Yes. So how do I answer that question? For this to work it has to be part of an over-all plan and strategy, where the relationship between the TET and the BSO is crucial and a synergistic effect is the outcome.

Another part of me says this: Tribal Engagement Teams have their own battlespace. They have no need and no desire for conventional forces in these TET zones. Tribes will tie-in as the situation dictates and develops. The tribal engagement strategy is an economy of force effort. Some staffs and commanders are systemically and conceptually unable to manage tribal engagement, so we will move them out of the areas and put them in places where we can generally play to their strengths. The TETs are specifically designed to work in this type of environment. Additionally, battlespace owners are not deconflicting battlespace in the current operational environment. There are multiple units of varying countries that are moving independent of “coordination.” TETs are easy. They own their own space and have accountability for what goes on within it. I would also argue that 2001-2003 was Afghanistan’s best years because of 1) decentralized action , 2) small footprint of US forces, 3) no major “occupier” type bases, and 4) no cumbersome chain of command to slow operations down.

B. Risk Aversion. When we put restrictions on ourselves that hurt our own ability to win a war, that is a bad thing. What makes it even worse is when these restrictions are put on units because higher command believes it is actually protecting its soldiers. In many but not all cases, these orders or mandates are counterproductive. One example: in Afghanistan an order came out that “all missions would be conducted in MICH helmet and body armor.” Well, I am sure that got put in there because someone, somewhere did a direct action mission without a helmet and got shot in the head, or something like that. What did that cause? My ODA and I were in the Konar Valley fighting and hunting a very smart and brutal enemy. Where did they hide. Deep in the mountains. To get to them was a monumental task, which would have been impossible with helmets and body armor. What do you do now as a small unit leader? Wearing that stuff in 105 degree weather, five kilometers into a nine kilometer movement that started at 2,300 feet and will end at 6,000 is suicide. You have three choices and all of them are bad. It puts me as a small unit leader in a situation where I have to decide if I am going to follow an order that is putting me and men at more risk and increases the chances of mission failure or to not follow an order.

To specifically address your concern, I was not implying that we leave anyone “out to dry”. However, and without sounding like an ass or antagonistic–war is risky business. If we aren’t going to take some risks, we should re-think how we are fighting. Which is worse, four guys dying hitting an IED on a road that they are forced to travel on daily because there is no other road, or four TET members being overrun by a 300-man Taliban element in some remote tribal area? I would turn the question around and ask, What happened at Wanat? My point is that these TETs would have to rely on other things for protection than guns and armor. Interpersonal skills, courage, detailed planning, relationship-building skills, intelligence nets. The bottom line would be that it would be the tribes who would be protecting them. Now, we would bring guns, training, medical supplies, access to CF units resources, PRTs, NGOs, etc…but the TETs would rely on the tribe for a vast majority of their security and protection. That turns this equation around quite a bit – don’t you agree?

Another point that I want to bring out, on a personal note is: I was a combat advisor in Iraq for the National Police Quick Reaction Force Commando battalion in ‘06-’07. Many lessons learned from that experience, but the point here is that every single CONOP [Concept of Operation] that I ever briefed had a section that said this: ”If we hear a net call that any US or Iraqi unit in Baghdad is involved in a troops in contact (TIC) we will immediately delay our mission and move to the area as quickly as possible to support…”

This happened dozens of times over the next 15 months. We bailed out many a US and Iraqi unit. That is what we do – all of us. Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine. Infantry, EOD, Combat Logistics Patrol, Special Forces, Navy Seals, Rangers, PRTs, whatever. We would all come to each other’s aid. Would I want your frequencies and call signs if I was located 40 kilometers from your firebase if I needed you? Of course. How about you guys out patrolling and you get hit right outside my tribal area? You call and one TET guy with 200 tribal security force members shows up in ten minutes with guns blazing, runs off the Taliban, takes your casualties back into their area, we begin treatment of the casualties in a secure village and call the MEDEVAC in there? Will that help? Will you guys now trust this tribe more? Will your battalion or brigade commander fly out the next day and thank these tribesmen for what they have done? Will he build on that relationship? Will the unit who was helped returned there and give the tribal leader a gift?

My point in saying that some TETs would die alone with no support is this: it will happen. Things can and will go wrong. But that happens with any strategy and mission, all the time. The type of person that I would ask to be on a TET with me would understand the dangers. It would be a “yeah, so what?” type of look if you asked them about it.

The willingness to go after the fallen does not equate to risk-aversion. Having been a part of personnel recovery planning for a lost US soldier, believe me, we are still risk-averse when it comes to even that mission. We are risk-averse because we build large bases, bigger vehicles, add more armor and equipment to soldiers instead of living with and fighting alongside Afghan tribesman. FM 3-24 is a great manual. However, it is also the “Catch-22 of counterinsurgency,” in that the more you force-protect, the less safe you are. If we do not plan to accept risk up front, then we need to reconsider what we are doing and how we are doing it…from the tactical to the strategic level.

I just don’t see the issue here. Is it possible to “work around” this? No. Two to six guys with the tribe. That’s all - that is it. More than that can be a problem. But again, it depends on the situation. Depending on where the TET is sent there is indeed the possibility that more soldiers would need to be sent…”Never say never…”.

C. I love the “space shuttle” quote…you are right and that was funny! Yes, this is problematic. This type of strategy and these types of teams would take a complete and total paradigm shift at the highest levels of our military organizations, and then the ability to push these changes down to group/brigade and battalion commanders. I believe one of the biggest challenges would be, if and when this type of strategy were implemented, that the further down the food-chain it went, the more that commanders on the ground would be unable to let it work. This also includes a dramatic administrative shift in our ability to put the right person, with right passion, in the right place. That is hard for us to do. When I watched General McChrystal on “60 Minutes,” I saw him ask on a VTC why it was taking so long for him to get the people he was asking for over to Afghanistan. If it’s this hard for him, how hard is it going to be to re-vamp the entire system? If you and I spend the next three years working in Pakistan as military advisors, what happens to our careers? I know that there are many soldiers who don’t really care about promotions, schooling, OERs, NCOERs, etc…they just want a good mission with good people. We have to harness them and those passions and find an alternate way to reward them for their sacrifices.

I bet that if you became a TET team leader, got some language and cultural training, some time to work on your interpersonal skills that involved scenario-based training, got to hand-pick your team and filled it with guys you knew and trusted, then you got to fly in and spend 60 to 90 days on the ground with me and my TET watching, learning and training; that now you and your team go somewhere else with another tribe and be successful. Would it take time? Yes. Would it be hard? Yes. ould high level commanders and policy makers have to push to make this happen? Yes. Could we do it? Yes.

Another personal experience. When I was in Iraq I did not have other SF guys working with me. I was assigned a transition team. I went through two of them. Bottom line up front: one of the teams was phenomenal…six awards for valor, aggressive, smart, enthusiastic…I would have put them up against any small unit in the country at “Mounted Operations”. We trained and rehearsed and trained and rehearsed, we worked daily on individual and collective skills that we needed to fight…and we went out and fought all the time. The second team? They were given the same mission, we did the same training, I pushed, pulled, prodded, coaxed, threatened, praised, begged, you name it…they just would not come together as a team. I wanted to stay in Iraq but I just couldn’t work under those conditions anymore. My idea is to very carefully select the TET team leaders. Then let him select his team. He will not pick his buddies or friends, he will pick the guys he knows will fight and die right alongside him, that have good interpersonal skills, that are smart and dependable, that are loyal and want to be there. Then you will have a great TET in the making. Am I wrong? Tell me if I am. I may be overestimating what I think about the US soldier, but I don’t think so.

The number teams needed would not be very high. The overall plan would look something like this:

1. Determine which tribes to support (this is currently being done and analyzed, I am sure, by people who know a lot more about it than I do). While doing research and putting the paper together I did come up with criteria for this, there are many people who have understanding, knowledge and backgrounds that would be needed to ensure the right tribes were chosen.

2. Determine how many teams were needed.

3. Begin small. One, two, maybe three teams.

4. Then the flow of teams happens in a “step” process. Are the current TETs being successful? What were you training deficiencies? How did the criteria we used to pick the tribe work? Etc…

5. Infil follow-on teams with the TETs that are currently on the ground to continue their training, their cultural knowledge and skills, to improve their language skills, and to just “get their feet wet”…

6. Infil them with their tribes…

7. Continue the process.

We just do not need a lot of people. I keep saying that. We need less, not more. If we have five successful TETs with major power brokers/tribes, we will have accomplished a great deal with a very small amount of resources. That’s with thirty or forty guys on the ground (now this doesn’t include the support and combat service support personnel). I could pick out almost that many right now. We are not looking to mass produce TETs or create a new branch. We can easily select, train, and OJT evaluate replacements for sustainment. As more tribes become attracted to success, we don’t necessarily need more TETs,. One TET could service multiple tribes. In fact, that is what we want. We want tribal alliances. Makes the end game more simple.

D. To your last point: I am an advocate of killing. There are many, many folks out there who are just going to have to die if we want to achieve success. Period. One of my favorite articles is “In Praise of Attrition” by Ralph Peters. If anyone sees TETs as Peace Corps with guns, they are missing the point. There will be a lot of fighting. A lot. The fight will become extremely personal and close up. The good TETs will be fighting for THEIR families, THEIR best friends, THEIR brothers, THEIR sisters … THEIR tribe. Some will die doing so. But in doing so, “we” meld deeper and deeper into their world and are accepted more and more–beating the Taliban and al-Qaeda at their own game.

Now, are we going to stay there for the next hundred years? No. But can’t we maintain some type of air power, some type of QRF, some type of logistical support for a very, very small group of people who will stay and remain a part of the tribal society? The other answer is to completely abandon them, which would be a strategic mistake and morally wrong.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda are not supermen. Who has the strongest ideology? Who has the stronger character? Who cares more about the everyday Afghan? Who is willing to pay a higher price? I don’t know. But I would personally like to find out.

I and five other guys I know are willing to give basically the rest of our adult lives to find out.

To the Taliban and al-Qaeda I would say, “Come on down here and try to hurt anyone in this tribe. Just one of us. But you had better pack a lunch, because you are going to be here for a while.”

Jim, I enjoyed writing this in response to your excellent and very thoughtful questions. I have learned a very important lesson over the last few weeks. It is almost impossible to express yourself, your passion, your values, your ethos, your beliefs over an email, a blog, a post or a paper. Everything that is said sounds egotistical, all-knowing, or stand-offish. I hope I didn’t come off that way to you. I believe in what I am saying and I respect and thank you for writing.

STRENGTH AND HONOR

Maj. Jim Gant

Posted in One Tribe At A Time | 8 Comments

One Tribe At A Time #8: E-mails from the Troops

By Steven Pressfield | Published: November 23, 2009

[This is going to be a long post. What follows are just some of hundreds of e-mails received by Maj. Gant in response to his paper, "One Tribe At a Time." The first is from Luke Murray, who lost his leg in an IED strike near Sarkhani, Afghanistan on 18 July 2003 as a member of Maj. Gant's ODA 316. He gave permission to post his e-mail to the blog.]

Jim,

Just finished reading your paper. I have been following it on Mr. Pressfield’s blog for the last couple weeks. Being one of the privileged few who actually saw these practices first hand, I know they work. Your articulation of what you did and how to improve these basic ideas into TET’s is perfect. The writing was laid out so even someone without any type of military background could understand it and see the wisdom in this approach.

I know that these strategies work. I know what a dedicated team can do. Everytime I hear about how we are losing the war in Afghanistan, I always think of our success in Mangwel.

I think of you and the others often. Good hunting on your next trip, and, as always, if there is anything you need brother, do not hesitate to ask.

-Luke

* * *

Dear Jim (if I may)

I’m a former commander of the British SBS and I read your paper “One Tribe at a Time” with great interest and approval. I and two friends/colleagues have been trying to push the tribal line for the past nine months or so but without much success. We’ve pushed our views at quite a few influential and heavyweight people on both sides of the Atlantic but no one seems convinced enough to join the cause! The only headway of any promise so far has been with Paddy Ashdown (Lord Ashdown – former leader of our Liberal party) who was at school with me and also in the Royal Marines and SBS. Paddy as you may recall was in the running to be the UN supremo in Afghanistan (in 2008) but (not surprisingly) was turned down by Karzai. He has started to say some of the right things. I would very much like to establish contact with you and discuss how best and how much further we can push the word. I’m convinced that the only route with any realistic chance of success is the tribal one – all other options currently being discussed are, in my opinion, based on flawed assumptions or hopes, e.g. Afghanistan needs a western-style centralised government in order to prosper and keep out Al Qaeda; the Taliban and Al Qaeda can be defeated or kept at bay with large numbers of troops from a centrally controlled army and that these can eventually be provided by an expanded and western trained Afghan army and police force. It doesn’t need me to point out to you what’s wrong with these ideas.

* * *

Major Gant,

I just read your piece, One Tribe at a Time. You are 110% correct about what you wrote. I was in Jalalabad from Sept 02 to April 09 and worked the intel and did all the liason work with the tribes. It was a flashback in time for me, as we both used the same techniques to stay alive. I carried a book with 9/11 pics much the same as you did on your computer showing elders in the Tora Bora mountains why we were there. Maybe someone will listen.

Take care,

* * *

Hello MAJ Gant,

I just finished reading “One Tribe at a Time”. Thanks for writing such a thoughtful piece. I was particularly interested in how your coments on how a Tribal Engagement Strategy promotes good governance. I served at Kandahar Airfield from XXX, where I was the Command Judge Advocate for ARSIC-S and legal mentor for my counterparts in the Afghan Army at Hero Camp. (In civilian life, I have been an assistant district attorney in XXX for many years.) I worked with the Afghans five days a week and I also participated an assessment of the civilian criminal justice institutions in Zabul Province in 2007. I quickly learned the Afghan “governmental” legal system is absent in great stretches of the country, and where it does, it is thoroughly corrupt. Afghans don’t trust the formal courts,and with good reason. I was glad that you mentioned the Taliban’s efforts to provide their own Sharia-based dispute resolution service who told me that villagers preferred it to the government’s courts because it is honest, fast, and free. I heard about this from the British legal advisor in Helmand Province. I want to say,as a lawyer, I think you are right on when you advocate encouraging and supporting the use of tribal shuras and jirgas in resolving disputes. It will be many, many years before Kabul will be able to extend its court system into the provinces, if ever. When I heard about Pashtunwali, I read as much as I could find about it. With some modification, I believe it could and should serve as the first level of a justice system. I think this is especially true when it comes to disputes over land and water rights.

You write on pg. 26 on the the tribal jirga system could enforce the rule “backed up by a Tribal Engagement Team to bring U.S. resources, leadership, and training. to bear.” As you can I see, I agree with you wholeheartedly about strengthening Pashtunwali, jirgas, and shuras, but I’m wondering, if our government could be convinced, specifically how we would bring U.S. resoruces, leadership, and training to bear.

Thanks again for a great piece.

* * *

Jim:

Finished reading “One Tribe At A Time”. Wow…somebody gets it. Your analysis is on target and your solution is a good one. Served as a PSYOP officer in Afghanistan in XXX. It was very discouraging. Also served as CA Officer (CERP Manager) in Iraq XXX. It was quite frustrating at times due to the restrictions and limitations on the use of the money. Let’s hope the leadership takes your ideas and implements them.

* * *

Dear Major Gant,

Let me first congratulate you for “out of the box thinking”. I guess all the War Colleges and think tanks in the US don’t preach or teach what you are proposing. All one needs to study is the way Al Qaeda (Arabs , foreigners..) were able to make Afghanistan their home base. I have always maintained that the only people who will defeat Talibanism and as a corollary defeat Al Qaeda will be the Pashtuns. Even the Pak Army fully committed has only so much stamina.

Take it from a Pashtun.

Best wishes.

* * *

Sir,

I was a student of yours approximately a year ago. I just finished reading your paper and I must tell you that it was remarkable. I truly hope you pursue numerous further publications in the future because I feel your insight and knowledge are both priceless. I always felt that you were the single greatest instructor/mentor a warrior could ever hope to receive and the lessons I have learned from your instruction and the example you set for us have led to great success for me and my team, both personally/professionally, as well as operationally. It seems like every email I write you is more of a thank you letter, but its much less than you deserve. So once again sir, congratulations on writing an outstanding paper and thank you again for sharing your wealth of knowledge.

My best wishes to you and your family,

Strength and Honor.

* * *

Jim-

You article is without question one of the best written on the war in Afghanistan. All of the military folks I have assigned to me have this as a must-read within the next 2 weeks. I wish everyone in Congress, DoD and the State Department would read this as well. I do not know if you saw the Frontline episode on Afghanistan a couple weeks ago. There was one part that summed up what we are doing wrong. Went like this. Marine NCO armed to the teeth telling the local Afghan villagers that the Taliban will not hurt them if they go to the market. The interpreter did not speak the local dialect which led to the frustration. How can you tell villagers (farmers) that they won’t be killed when you are armed to that extent? We just don’t get it.

* * *

Jim, I wish you the absolute best in the future wherever that may be. I have the utmost respect for your professionalism and dedication to the fight. If there is anything at all I can do please let me know. Lifelong offer.

Best regards-

* * *

Sir,

I am a Platoon Leader deploying to Afghanistan shortly. Having recently read your paper, I am inspired to follow up. I passed your paper along to my Squad Leader for a LPD, with the assignment to assess and develop ways to integrate the tactics outlined in your paper for a conventional infantry platoon. I am anticipating some good feedback and ideas. If time permits, would you comment on this same topic?

I fully intend to glean what I can from One Tribe at a Time and this correspondence in order to exert such tactics in our fight.

Thank you Sir,

* * *

Jim,

Enjoyed your article – you and your old ODA deserve any accolades that may be coming your way. Sent out your piece to all the Co. Commanders and the Command Group in my unit. Will provide you any feedback if you are interested. On tap to go back to OIF this Summer, but we are all hoping to get changed to Afghanistan. Like you, I miss a lot of the people there and still keep somewhat in the loop through my old interpreters. Even went so far as to inquire about the Afghan Hands Initiative, but was told all slots were filled. Take care.

* * *

MAJ Gant-

I’m sure you’re getting bombarded with emails. I just finished reading your article. I think your assessment is spot-on and certainly consistent with my experiences (especially in Nuristan and Kunar–I’ve spent many a day on the Pesch River). Unfortunately, due to family health issues I had to leave the Q-course prematurely, so I may never get the chance to serve on a TET. A couple of questions did pop into my head, that I’d like to ask you if you don’t mind and have the time.

1) How does the TES prevent a resurgence in tribal strong-arming and warlords? If for example the Ghilzai Pashtuns outnumber the Safi Pashtuns in Laghman Province, how does the TES promote a peaceful coexistence without open warfare? Perhaps the possibility of tribal warfare is preferred to the status quo, which is already filled with fighting?

2) How do we ensure quality TETs? Currently, the vast majority of the military with the maturity and training to conduct TET missions would come from SF. Perhaps some members of conventional forces would have the right mindset, but certainly not all the majority. SF is already stretched thinly in Afghanistan with 40+ ODAs operating with ANSF. How do we recruit, screen, and train the necessary numbers of TETs? (By the way, sign me up!)

Regardless, I think if this article gets into the right hands, we may stand a chance at truly seeing success in Afghanistan. Thank you for writing this necessary piece.

Regards,

* * *

Jim,

I am back in my old unit and leaving shortly for a great trip. I have been watching my younger guys and taking note of their UW/COIN knowledge. I have several former students of yours. Each team member is strong, motivated, and of above average intelligence and competence. I have been able to speak freely on our SF subject matter with each of them because of your/our cadres performance as RS instructors. I like to follow up on the effort that we put into these guys; I am thoroughly impressed, and I don’t give compliments freely. My team has been subjected to mandatory reading, self-study, and intense discussion on what SF should be; and they do with zeal. What finally prompted this email is that through self-study my junior 18C happened on your article “One Tribe at a Time”. I have not read it as of yet, but I’m sure I’ll be impressed. If it’s not too much to ask I’d like to be sent any future writing that you do, and the occasional piece of advice. I hope things are going well for you.

* * *

Jim,

I hope you are doing well and getting settled and ready for the incredible work you are about ready to conduct. We are all here in Iraq right now for the COIN academy. Most of it we already seen in Polk, but it’s good that some of the BDE leadership is seeing it, so we are hopefully getting on the same sheet of music. Because this is mostly death by powerpoint, I still feel I am in Polk instead of in a war zone. My only reminder is a cargo pocket of live ammo and helos flying overhead every now and then. In addition to the honor of calling you a good friend, I have a lot to thank you for. I feel that being exposed to your warrior ethos will carry me a long way in ensuring I’ll have what it takes to doing what needs to be done. You got my head right and focused on the job soon to be at hand. I do have inner excitement to get this started. Thank you. You take care of yourself and I look forward for the chance that our paths may cross again. ntil later,

* * *

Dear Major Gant

Fraternal greetings. Being a past CIA para-military operations officer and police officer for over 35 years I now live quietly in the Southern Philippines, and work as a rural primary care physician serving poor indigent children. I received your book thesis ” One tribe at a time” via my CIA friends and was amazed that although we have never seen or met we have come to the same conclusion. In your case Afghanistan and in my case the Muslim controlled Southern Philippines.

I wrote my thought piece suggesting a new direction and not pointing blame at anyone. My only statement was “We are lossing- and the Basilan Model ( Used in the Southern Philippines ) the U.S. military holds up as success is a failue” Get over it and move on!”

One of the main problems is no one is willing to think outside the box. If you are a military officer (SF) or state department employee you must “ticket punch” and be a “team player” to progress in your chosen field. If you attempt to go in any other direction the building falls on your head and generally your career is over.

I sent my article via my CIA friends to folks in the know in the Pentagon who deal exclusively with the Southern Philippines. If I would have been a Catholic and writing about the church I would have been burnt at the stake.

Subsequently I have sent you my article as an attachment for your reading pleasure, and you be amazed how close we are.

Anyway enjoy your book - However I know you are going back, so work safe if you can.

Semper Fi

* * *

Dear Maj Gant,

I wanted to take a moment to thank you for your service. I’ve just started reading your monograph, “One Tribe At A Time”. I’ve come to the idea that it won’t be put into service because, frankly, it makes too damn much sense. Our new political masters have not, to date, shown much common sense. I will forward it, with your permission, to my Congressman. Additionally, if you allow, I will publish a link to your paper on my blog. I have (I think) maybe 10 readers, but every little bit helps. Thank you again for serving our great country.

Sincerely,

* * *

Hello Jim,

It’s great to hear from you. It was an honor for me to serve in Afghanistan. I think about Afghanistan and the Afghan people almost every day. I am at your service. I’d be honored to help you any way I can. Feel free to call me or e-mail me. Thank you for everything you have done, and everything you continue to do for our country.

* * *

Dear Jim:

It’s hard to believe that it’s been 9 years since we last talked. A lot has happened in that short timeframe. I’ve been doing a lot of study on Afghanistan and came across your article, “One Tribe at a Time.” I found it to be very insightful and well written. I fully agree with your premise. Knowing you as I did back then, I was not at all surprised to learn of your continued commitment and service to our Country –and to the people of Afghanistan.

I want to thank-you for your service and the sacrifices you have made and will continue to make. When I saw your name and photos in the article I was immediately taken back to an afternoon in my office when I counseled you on your OER. I remember the humility and embarrassment you showed when I told you you were the best lieutenant in our battalion. I remember sharing my assessment of your training prowess and of the warrior ethos you exuded.

I have always believed I am a good judge of character — you may have been embarrassed and humbled, but I clearly got it right with you. I retired in 2006. I am heartened to know that we have great Americans like you and your brothers from ODA 316 serving our country, our Army and brother warriors. Let me finish by saying once again thank-you for what you have done and for what you will surely do in the future. And as much as possible, be safe — Soldiers deserve your leadership.

Very Respectfully,

* * *

Major Gant,

I want to start of by thanking you for your service in the military. I just finished reading One Tribe at a Time, and I don’t even know how to express to you what a relief it is to have read this. I am currently working on my Masters in International Affairs and my concentration is Islamic Reform movements, particularly in South and Southeast Asia, and I did my undergrad work in Middle Eastern Studies. My biggest fear is finding a job doing research, and watching it slowly diminish as it passes from hand to hand until all that is left is what fits into the politicians agenda. Policymakers tend to cling to outdated theory regarding conventional warfare and international relations, and it is time to examine the individual level of analysis. Not often do people have such experiences and are in the position to adequately and intelligently utilize what they’ve learned in the way that you have. You took a step that we, as students and researchers studying this region, have been waiting for for a long time, so thank you for that.

* * *

Major Gant,

I read the Internet .pdf download of your tome. I was intrigued by your explanation of how one may be successful in Afghanistan, in war, and with the Afghans themselves. It has always been my belief that the Arab world is ruled by tribes and families. That was about asfar as I got. Your interaction with the tribesmen really sheds some “much-needed” illumination. I found that by accepting your experiences of co-equal associationwith the Afghans, I was let into the group, even as one viewing from outside the tent. I learned a lot!

The question that kept nagging at my mind was: “Where in the Hell is the leadership of our strategic and tactical forces?!” General Petraeus and his “surge” in Iraq is one thing, but Afghanistan is an entirely different matter. All one must do is evaluate why the Russians got out of Dodge. They were unwilling to work with the people of the land!

I am so thankful that your treatise is available. Not only is it a testament of what has occurred, but it makes abundantly clear that you and your team have fostered exceptional good will among “Sitting Bull,” his men, and their families. That was no easy task, and yet it prevails – kudos!!

* * *

Jim -

Great paper – many truisms here – quick question – where are you now? Reason I ask is that I’d like to get you in front of my Battalion and impart what you know/have experienced to my officers and NCOs – thx!

* * *

Jim,

I just started reading your paper and agree with most of what you have said. Like you (but to a lesser degree) I have had substantial experience training Iraqi Army and Iraqi police being on 2 MiTTs (12 and 15 month rotations). I do not have any experience in Afghanistan and the dynamics there could be quite different. My only concern with training the tribes and empowering them as we would the local, district, provincial and National governments is that you legitimize them to the same extent as we are trying to do with the recognized government. My experiences in Iraq, with the Sons of Iraq (the awakening, concerned local citizens or Sahwa) was that some ground commanders empowered them so much that they felt they were equals to/as legitimate as the actual government. There were plenty of situations in which the SoIs felt they did not have to listen to Iraqi Army or Iraqi Police and routinely conducted their own missions, imprisoned “suspects” and wouldn’t turn them over to legitimate authorities. I would ask you, how do you find the balance between partnering with tribes and legitimizing the government. I will finish your paper and may find the answers out later. I wanted to get that question out to you while it was fresh in my mind.

Be careful down range.

* * *

Under your key tasks the idea of establish and maintain rapport with the main and most influential tribes is spot on. The issue is whether we want to work with the most influential tribe in the area. The decision won’t be made by you. It will be a political decision. And now – can you – with your idealistic idea of what this looks like, still do your job? Use the “USA Today” criteria…how will this play out when everyone discovers that yesterdays “Sitting Bull” is today’s “most dangerous warlord”…? Think about it.

* * *

Jim,

what if you get put with the wrong tribe, the “losing” political tribe? Not based on right and wrong, but of “who likes who”? You will not get this done. You are not “Lawrence of Arabia”…and you have made serious false assumptions about what the endstate in Afghanistan is.

* * *

Major Gant,

I am LTC in the Army, and though I enjoyed your article very much, what you are proposing is just not possible, feasible or even worth trying. How do we develop metrics (that are useful) for nation-building? We will need something to let us know that your efforts are working. Something more than your gut feeling. I think you over estimate your skills and under estimate the Army’s ability to do what needs to be done.

Posted in One Tribe At A Time | 5 Comments

One Tribe at a Time #7: Size Matters, continued

By Steven Pressfield | Published: November 16, 2009

If a Tribal Engagement Strategy (TES) were to be tried in Afghanistan, how exactly would it work?

Last week, in the first part of this “Size Matters” post, we spoke with Maj. Jim Gant about the optimal size for a single U.S. Tribal Engagement Team (TET)—that is, the tactical unit that would be attached to a single Afghan tribe. Maj. Gant strongly advocated the position that smaller is better. Six to twelve men, no more.

"The Security Plan would be very well rehearsed and executed many times with the tribesmen taking the lead."

There is [Maj. Gant says] what I call an “acceptable level of integration.” It is something that can be hard to determine unless you are on the ground with the tribe daily. At the tactical level too many soldiers in a tribal area can cause major disruption of the daily life of the villagers. It can also bring a fight to the tribe that otherwise would not have been there. With a full platoon of soldiers, who more than likely will set up some type of mini-fire base, walking around in body-armor and helmets, the tribesmen and their families will quickly become alienated by the American presence. At the strategic level, too many troops and we become “occupiers.” What we are after at the tactical level is cooperation without dependence.

SP: Someone reading this Q&A might say, “Yeah, those small numbers sound great in some little village that is peaceful, but what if you guys get into really serious trouble? What if the enemy comes after you in force?”

JG: I have put more thought into this than any other tactical question. As in any military mission, security is the first and most important task. Now, in this case, the task is daunting as hell, since the consequences of being unable to accomplish security would be catastrophic. In some cases small units are able to overcome lapses in security with overwhelming firepower. A TET will not be able to do this. I will not get into the specifics here, but believe me when I say the planning prior to the mission being conducted, coupled with the extreme steps that would be initially executed on the ground; no enemy force would be able to walk into your area in the middle of the night and cut your throat while you were asleep. That just would not happen. Period.

Now, in the case you describe above, let me emphasize a few things. First, the TET’s immediate and most critical task would be to establish security. Everything the TET did for the first 90 days (an estimate) would be in relation to security–security for the TET and security for the tribe. This security would be layered and have depth as well as reach. It would consist of early-warning systems and intelligence fusion that would allow the TET to use the U.S. intelligence assets it would have at its disposal, and fuse these with the incredible human intelligence systems that are already established on the ground by the tribe. The situation that occurred recently up in Nuristan was extreme and tragic with U.S. soldiers fighting for their lives. I was not there and do not know the specifics of the situation, but I do think that they were in Combat Outposts (COPs). A TET’s circumstances would be completely different. Think about it. The enemy would have to mass and then attack an Afghan village, and would have to kill many Afghan tribesmen in the attack.

It is not as if the TET would be the only personnel there with weapons. As I pointed out, I would infil with weapons and ammunition on Day One. This is for several reasons. One, as a “gift of honor” to the tribal chief. Two, as a show of commitment and trust. And three, so there will be tribesmen with guns and ammo to help protect themselves, their tribe and us.

Here again, we circle around to the main point of the whole premise of the power in a TES. It is about building relationships. The head tribesman and his fighters will not allow us (the TET) to be harmed. Your earlier posts “Gifts of Honor: A Tale of Two Captains“ and “A Tale of Two Captains, Part II,” tell the story of Sitting Bull [the tribal chief, Malik Noorafzhal, with whom Maj. Gant and his Special Forces team, ODA 316, worked in Konar province in 2004] receiving the letter from my father.

I had asked my father to send him a knife with “Sitting Bull” engraved on it—and a letter, man-to-man, father-to-father. Here is part of it:

My son says you are a great warrior. He respects you and considers you to be his friend. He tells me that your enemies are his enemies. He says he would give his life to protect you. Be my son’s father while he is in your country. Take this gift from us as a token of our friendship.

After I read the letter to Sitting Bull, he replied:

“Tell your father not a hair on your head will be harmed as long as you are with me, you are now my son.”

It’s all about relationships!

SP: Major Gant, if you could design an overall Tribal Engagement Plan, what sort of fires and forces would you deploy in reserve and what would their role be in relation to the TETs who were actually living with the tribes? Would ‘big army’ run patrols or operations? Would they serve as a Quick Reaction Force to back up the TETs? How would you envision the optimum situation?

JG: That ties into the above question. The overall security would absolutely have Close Air Support (CAS) planning considerations. Worst-case scenario, the TET could get air coverage in six hours, four hours or whatever, which will then be plugged back into the TET’s overall security plan. The TET would know long in advance what size and type of Aerial Quick Reaction Force was available, with worst-case scenario times for them as well. This information would once again be plugged back into the overall security plan. In the end, what the TET would come up with is a security plan that says we know we have to hold them off for (fill in the blank) amount of time before we can get any CAS, and we must hold them off for (fill in the blank) amount of time before U.S. soldiers are hitting a pre-planned HLZ (Helicopter Landing Zone) off-loading troops. Yes, securing an HLZ would be part of the plan. This security plan would be very well rehearsed and executed many times with the tribesmen taking the lead in the fight for their villages and tribal area.

On a larger scale, my paper “One Tribe At A Time” discusses that what I am trying to accomplish with the TET, in relation to everyone else outside the tribe, is synergism. The “battle space owner”—meaning the main-force U.S. unit and its commanders in whose AO (Area of Operations) the TET is working—would have to be completely aware and support what the TET was trying to do. The TET would draw in all the other units in the area to help support the goals of the tribe, while also supporting the goals and objectives of the other Coalition Force units in the area, as well as looking for every opportunity for the district, regional, and central governments to aid the tribe, or for the tribe to aid the government.

Just a couple of days ago, I spoke with a trusted friend who is Special Forces. He pointed out the importance of building systems within the tribe that will be able to accept outside help if and when it comes—whether it is from the government or NGOs. It would also include close contact with the Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs to help facilitate concerns and grievances. To the point of the question, ideally the tribal area would be turned into a Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) or what I think they now are calling an “Operations Box,” where everyone and anyone who wanted to pass through the area, with either land or air forces, would have to get approval from the TET on the ground. This may seem extreme, but think about a main-force U.S. unit conducting a raid on a tribal elder based on bad intelligence (it DOES happen). Then what? We lose 15 months of relationship and capacity building overnight. Think about the ramifications of a 500-pound bomb being dropped on the tribal leader’s daughter’s home, killing her, her husband and their four kids. The TET could end up hanging from ropes in the village square. That tribal area would have to belong to the TET. “Special trust and approval” would have to be used when dealing with the TET and supporting them in determining what types of operations could and could not be conducted in their “OP Box”.

SP: It’s clear from the newspapers that President Obama is getting close to making his decision about whether or not to give Gen. McChrystal the additional troops the general has asked for—or possibly choosing to send some fraction, half, two-thirds, whatever. If a TES is implemented—even as a pilot program, an experiment in one or two provinces, or part of a single province—how do you think that would impact the need for further American troops?

JG: I know this: If General McChrystal thinks we need more troops, then we need more troops. To fight the war in Afghanistan under the same type of COIN model that has turned out to be successful in Iraq (although comparing Iraq and Afghanistan is very dangerous), there must be more troops. But I also believe that a seriously-applied Tribal Engagement Strategy will free up some of the troops that the generals need in other places, doing other things. One of the reasons I believe it is so attractive is that it is an “economy of force” mission with Afghans taking the lead from Day One.

General McChrystal recently said, “. . . this fight is for the Afghan people, it’s not with the Afghan people. It’s to protect the Afghan people. And so I think, that has to be foremost in how we operate.” I believe that this Tribal Engagement Strategy, with the use of small, well-trained U.S. teams, will not only meet the General’s intent, but will help provide the basis for long-term “success” in large portions of Afghanistan.

Also posted in Afghanistan | 8 Comments

One Tribe At A Time #6: Size Matters

By Steven Pressfield | Published: November 9, 2009

[Today we have a special follow-up interview with Maj. Jim Gant, on the subject of how big (or small) a Tribal Engagement Team should be—and what kind of large-scale support it would need. But first I want to say thanks to the many, many readers who have responded to Maj. Gant’s paper “One Tribe At A Time” and to all the members of the military, policy and journalism communities who have helped to circulate it. Special thanks to James Dao of the N.Y. Times (“Going Tribal in Afghanistan”), James Meek of the N.Y. Daily News (“Memo to Obama: Talk to Jim Gant or Risk Losing Afghan War”), to Small Wars Journal and to Col. Dave Maxwell, to BlackFive and Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama, and to Glenn Reynolds (Instapundit) and Mark Safranski (Zenpundit.)

[Now to our interview:]

"Time is our most important weapon on the tactical level--and our most dangerous enemy on the strategic."

In a Tribal Engagement strategy, sometimes less is more—at least as it applies to the size of the individual Tribal Engagement Team. I wanted to get Maj. Gant’s thoughts on the subject:

SP: Jim, in your paper, “One Tribe At A Time,” you describe the ideal size for a Tribal Engagement Team as between six and twelve. In fact your original ODA team in Konar province was just six men. Why do you believe smaller is better?

JG: Steve, just to clarify, I started with nine guys on the team, but only six were Special Forces. We picked up three additional men in Afghanistan—a TAC-P, a PSYOP attachment and a Civil Affairs attachment. Those three guys went through all of the team’s individual skills training and all the team’s Immediate Action Drill (IAD) training. They lived with us, slept where we slept and did what we did. They were as much a part of the team as anyone. Now to answer the question:

Smaller is better for a Tribal Engagement Team (TET) for several reasons (and this only applies to tribes in Afghanistan.) First, with Afghan tribes there is what I call an “acceptable level of integration.” It is something that can be hard to determine unless you are on the ground with the tribe daily. Too many soldiers in a tribal area can cause major disruption of the daily life of the villagers. It can also bring a fight to the tribe that would not otherwise have been there. With a platoon of soldiers, who likely will set up a mini-fire base, walking around in body armor and helmets, the tribesmen will quickly become alienated by their presence. This is at the tactical level. At the strategic level, too many troops and we become “occupiers.”

What we are after at the tactical level is cooperation without dependence. The bottom line is that the tribe must be able to protect itself. We, the TET, will help facilitate this in a major way, but the TET cannot “secure” the tribe. The tribe has to secure the tribe.

Another point is that this “smaller is better” is counter-intuitive, like a lot of things we do at the tactical level. Tactically what we are dealing with is not a “clash of cultures” but we commit “cultural fratricide,” and too many troops with the tribes would be doing just that – trying to help would actually make the situation worse.

Another positive aspect of using a small team is that we show trust in the tribe on Day One by showing up with so few men. The tribesmen that I have dealt with are extremely smart and savvy. They understand the symbology of coming in with such a small force. It says more to them than any number of words. I can hear critics saying “symbology?” You are willing to risk your life and the lives of your men just to prove your men’s warrior ethos to the tribe? The answer is yes! On the flip side is this: how urgent is it for the TET to establish relationships? To be of value? To show their worth? It will be critical because their lives will depend on the tribes for protection.

The final aspect is one that I think a lot of people are missing. We aren’t going to roll the dice and play “pick a tribe.” Some serious analysis and information gathering must take place prior even to initial contact. That is where a prior relationship is an enormous plus. The Tribal Engagement Team can literally take months (six to nine) off the timeline to start seeing success because they will be going in with a prior relationship.

SP: When we were talking the other day, you said that an Afghan tribe could easily kill the U.S. Tribal Engagement Team attached to it any time it wanted to, because the team’s numbers were so few. Yet you also stated that you and your team felt safer in the village of Mangwel than you did in your own firebase. Why?

"It is not the armor on your vehicles that will keep you safe, but your relationship with the indigenous forces you're working with." Scott Gross in Mangwel, Konar province

JG: As I have said over and over to my students at the unconventional warfare (UW) stage of their Special Forces training, It is not the armor on your vehicles, your body armor or your weapons systems that will keep you safe … it is your relationship with the indigenous force that you are working with. “Friends don’t let friends get hurt.” This was true in my experience in Iraq, where the fighting was almost constant in ’06-’07, and of course it was true in Afghanistan with Malik Noorafzhal (“Sitting Bull”) and his tribe. “Rapport” is a word that is often thrown around. But what does it mean? It means relationship. What is a relationship based on? How strong is it? Is it mutual? How do you get it?

I have put together a model of how I believe you achieve the ultimate relationship with your indigenous, irregular or host-nation counterpart—with the end-state being “cultural integration.” Cultural integration is the point where you can be yourself and your counterpart can be himself with no concern for cultural taboos or cultural mis-steps. Now this is a very detailed and very long process, but it can and has been done by many more Special Forces soldiers than myself. Take a look at what SF did with the Montagnards in Vietnam. I would also like to reiterate that many other conventional units have been able to establish rapport with irregular forces and have a positive influence over them. It all comes down to TIME. In this type of situation, you have to invest your most precious commodity as an advisor and that is TIME. That is why I don’t care for the term Key Leader Engagement (KLE). In most cases, this is a meeting. Issues are discussed, plans are made, and then everyone goes their separate ways. This is not Tribal Engagement as I see it. In Afghanistan, with the tribes that I dealt with, the relationships grew in direct proportion to the amount of time invested in them. Good old-fashioned seconds, minutes, hours, days, months and years. The right five or six guys can offer a tribal leader and his tribe all the time in the world. Time is our greatest weapon at the tactical level and our greatest enemy at the strategic level.

As a tie-in to the above question – there is nothing (and I emphasize nothing) that can prove yourself and your team to the tribe more than fighting alongside them. That is the ultimate testament of your team as warriors and your commitment to the tribe. It will create the foundation for “influence without authority” that is the key to success in tribal engagement.

SP: One sentence popped out to me in last Monday’s post. If you remember, it was from an e-mail written to you by a female soldier who had served in Afghanistan in a capacity close to the tribes. She said, “The improvements in Paktia and Khowst were indescribable, but quickly faded as ‘big army’ moved in shortly after our exit in 2004.” Is there a point or number at which foreign forces on tribal turf become “too many” and cease being viewed by the tribes as guests and instead become occupiers? Do certain tenets of the Pashtunwali code of honor come into play, depending on how many Americans there are in an area?

JG: As I said above, there definitely is a point where too many troops becomes counter-productive. The hard part is determining where that is. There are times and locations where large-scale “search and attack” missions are not only necessary but critical. Even if a large-scale Tribal Engagement Strategy were adopted, there would be many times where a battalion of soldiers would need to air-assault in somewhere and kill insurgents. Also, make no mistake, there will be a lot of fighting at one point or another, even if the TET was extremely successful. The enemy is not just going to sit and do nothing as you build capacity within a tribal area.

SP: Col. Bing West, author of The Village and The Strongest Tribe, just wrote an excellent article for Small Wars Journal called “Afghanistan Trip Report.” One of his observations included the statement, “ … ODA teams quickly develop relationships [with tribes] regardless of tour length, because they are mature. Relationships with Afghan elders require elderly (ahem, E6 or above!) NCOs and officers … “ Would you agree that the ideal composition of a Tribal Engagement Team, in addition to being small, would also be “mature?”

JG: First of all, I am embarrassed to say that I just read The Village by Col. West a week ago. It is a tremendous book with so many lessons that it should be required reading for any TET.

Now, when talking about the specifics of what I would be looking for: first and foremost, I would want warriors–soldiers who like the fight, who enjoy the challenges of combat. Second, they would have to have excellent interpersonal skills. In a lot of cases, this would mean a more seasoned soldier. However, having just spent two years as an instructor out at the unconventional warfare (UW) phase of Special Forces training, I can testify that the majority of the time the worst soldier on the ODA would be the 18X; at the same time the best one would be an 18X. What is an 18X? It is a program where qualified personnel can join up and try out for SF “right off the street,” with no military experience. So I believe it is more about a skill set than about maturity. Now, the average age of a team that I would pick would be pretty “old,” with combat experience and very good interpersonal skills that I would have firsthand knowledge of. They would have to be effective communicators with extreme patience. Lastly, they would have to “want it.” This type of mission and this type of team would not be successful overnight; the team members would have to have an incredible commitment to the mission, the overall war effort, and of course to the tribe they would be living with.

[To be continued next Monday. I want to hear Maj. Gant’s thoughts on what sort of large-force backup the individual teams would need and how he would envision a full-scale Tribal Engagement Strategy working across an entire theater. My plan is to integrate these follow-up interviews as an addendum to the “One Tribe” paper.]