Download Major Jim Gant’s “One Tribe At A Time” to your computer, or view it right now.
[Because of the extraordinary response to Maj. Jim Gant's paper, One Tribe At A Time, I've decided to leave it up all week in the "Number One Slot." My ongoing interview with Chief Ajmal Khan Zazai will pick again next Friday; the Chief has been in Kabul all week, meeting with U.S. and British commanders, and we haven't had time to speak. So all's well that ends well!]
The downloadable and open-able .pdf of One Tribe is here, on the right. On a personal note, let me say again that I consider it a privilege to offer this document in full, not only because of my great respect for Maj. Jim Gant, who has lived and breathed this Tribal Engagement idea for years, but for the piece itself and for the influence it is already having within the U.S. military and policymaking community.
One Tribe At A Time is by no means a super-pro Beltway think tank piece. What it is, in my opinion, is an idea whose time has come, put forward by an officer who has lived it in the field with his Special Forces team members–and proved it can be done. And an officer, by the way, who is ready this instant to climb aboard a helicopter to go back to Afghanistan and do it again.
Questions and comments
At the moment, Maj. Gant is at Fort Polk, Louisiana, getting ready to deploy to Iraq, where he will lead an Iraqi commando battalion. He’ll be available in the meantime, however (depending of course upon time demands), to answer questions or take criticisms. Just respond in the comments section below. And I myself have further thoughts I’d like to offer on this subject in the coming weeks.
Here’s a quick one:
The most common response I anticipate to the Tribal Engagement concept (and it’s a valid criticism, shared by Maj. Gant) will go something like this: “Yeah, this is a great idea–but where are we going to find the men to implement it?”
Men for the job
Tribal Engagement Team members, should this concept be adopted, would be called upon to commit for multiple tours under the loneliest, harshest and most hazardous conditions imaginable. To succeed with the tribe they are assigned to, they would have to demonstrate impeccable combat credentials and, even rarer, possess the “people skills” to establish and maintain rapport across a cultural chasm—Western to Tribal Afghan—that has defeated every outside entity from Alexander the Great to the British and the Soviets. The task would be extraordinarily difficult, dirty and dangerous, and in the end would almost certainly be rewarded neither by career advancement (because the enterprise would be unprecedented and outside the normal channels of military promotion) nor by recognition from the public at large, who in all probability will rarely hear of it and wouldn’t understand or appreciate it if they did.
How can we identify and attract such men?
Do you remember this tiny, three-line ad from the London Times, December 29, 1913?
Men wanted for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honour and recognition in case of success.
5000 volunteers queued up in response to this advertisement, posted by Ernest Shackleton seeking crewmen for his Antarctic expedition.
I may be wrong, but I don’t think our young American warriors would respond with any less enthusiasm than their British cousins did a century ago to a similar call. Do you?
Again, many thanks to Maj. Jim Gant for writing One Tribe At A Time, to Printer Bowler for designing and editing the .pdf and to Callie Oettinger for managing the outreach. I’m proud to put this document in circulation with as much reach as this modest blog can offer. We all hope it proves of interest and of use.
87 Comments
Jim,
I have no doubts that you are making a strategic impact on Afghanistan, all be it, one tribe at a time. I, another SF MAJ, advocate your approach and will take your ideas with me as I engage in my future endeavors. I read your document and will continue to read and digest it since it takes me more than a few times to truly see the meaning of all things. My initial assessment is extremely positive and my personal experiences in Sangin District, Helmand Province 07′-08′ was brought to the fore front of my mind upon reading your story. I believe you are signing in tomorrow here at the big building, stop the G3 and visit.
Walt,
Will do brother…
ODA 316 was all over Sangin in 04. I will be glad to shake your hand and say “Thanks”…Helmond is no joke…
See you tomorrow.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim
Dear Steven,
I wanted to compliment you on your website and the very insightful pieces here. As well, I’d like to introduce myself, I am an Editorial Researcher for The Mark News (www.themarknews.com) in Toronto.
I thought you might be interested in a number of articles that we’ve just published dealing with the future of the Afghanistan Mission and Canada’s Role in it. Notably, the former Ambassadors to Afghanistan and NATO, as well as the former Vice-Chairman of the CIA National Intelligence Council bring valuable analysis. You can find the page here : http://www.themarknews.com/topics/4
Feel free to browse the articles. We’d be happy to have you publish them on your site, just please link back to us!
Let me know what you think.
Thanks,
Julie
I pray that the ground commanders can see the wisdom in this approach. I pray for the President, and all leaders making decisions, and at the same time I hope that this will succeed DESPITE the general trends I observe in government. Here’s why I doubt the top down lead:
Our problems in the United States, just as these problems in Afghanistan, are problems of family and small units. All problems are relationship based. Just as the British lost to our US troops when they marched down the street with drums beating and trumpets blaring, cut down by our own guerilla US forces at the start of the American Experiment, we will be worn down using conventional strategies.
President Obama’s solutions to the various challenges we face as a country take the approach that the government is here to help. The government is of the people, and it is the people. Only people can help when allowed the freedom to help themselves and given the right information. Government can never accomplish anything without allowing individuals to self govern and reach their potential.
God help this effort and help the President and his advisors to have a little more faith and trust in the fathers and mothers and children who make up the families that make up the United States of America. Only when responsibilities for changing things is placed on the fathers of our country, will any real change FOR THE BETTER occur. Change over the past year with Obama at the helm has certainly altered things, but I doubt many will acknowledge the changes as positive.
MAJ Gant, thank you and your men. You keep our families, your families and the families that you meet safe. As a father and husband, I thank you for doing my job. AIRBORNE !
From 2001 to 2003, I had the distinct honor of supporting our long-tabbers, in many places including Afghanistan, as the DASD for Counternarcotics. I spent a fair amount of time both in Tampa and in various places in-theater speaking with folks — from ODA NCOs (the best education) to SOCCENT and SOCOM leaders. I won’t begin the long discussion of why your bright thoughts only now seem to be reaching wide dissemination.
My concern, though, rests with a problem that we have seen since the first SOF deployments (and seems to be continuing).
Let’s assume that an ODB fully implements your plan (and gets higher HQs out of the way and you clearly observe as a requirement). Let’s also say that that ODB Commander has read your paper and fully implements it to success.
The problem seems — to me — to be that, once that successful ODB leaves after 1 year, all the good done is potentially at risk if another great ODB does not follow. More importantly, even if a great ODB comes in, the PERSONAL relationships that the previous team created may be lost due simply to the nature of human relationships.
Do you agree ? If so, isn’t an additional requirement (if, in fact, we are truly at war and willing to do what is necessary in Afghanistan) that the succesful ODB “plant the flag” and stay in their respective AO until mission (as you define it) success ? In other words, you could rotate 3SFG HQ (and, of course, appropriate leave for the men) but the 3rd SFG HOLDS its AO due to the unique relationships formed ?
In any case, I wish you, your men, your allies and all those in the fight the greatest mission success and safety.
You make us proud and thank you for your continuing service. All the Way !
Respectfully,
André
The Afghanis have no interstates, Starbucks, McMansions in sprawling suburbs, BUT ever notice how the Afghanis have something we have lost? They have home, community, family — roots. In America, we sold ours for money. The Major shows the importance of making these connections. We ignore his lesson at our peril – not only in Afghanistan, but also back here at home.
Dear Major Gant,
I have not read yet the entire book but only a long extract published in the edition of the Phnom Penh Post of Friday 22nd of January.
The extract was enough for me to understand the depth of your thoughts.
You are trying to replicate in Afghanistan what the French forces did in Laos and in the high region of Tonkin during the Indochina War with the GCMAs ( Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés).
GCMA’s are their name indicate were highly skilled airborne French soldiers- Officers and NCOs-, multi disciplinary, working hand in hand with local people- Hmong in Laos as well as in the high region and many other tribes such as White and Black Thai, Miaos and so on.
They acted independently, on the rear of the Vietminh forces. Their role was to gather intelligence, destroy and disrupt enemy forces, prepare the terrain for major operations while protecting the local tribes and their territories.
In Laos they were particularly instrumental during the operations aiming at reconquering the territory which was, prior to 1945, at the hand of the Japanese.
In the North West high region of Tonkin they were also very successful, controlling large areas which became out of bond for the Vietminh.
Unfortunately they were too few. The support they got from the Central Command was at time sketchy, specifically when they were confronted with MEDEVAC. Finally they were literally abandoned when the Central Command decided to change its tactics. In these extreme conditions some decided to continue the fight with the local people until complete vanishing; some others decided to rally after months spent in the jungle regular units.This is a very short overview of their history.
Your idea
Dear Major Gant,
I have not read the entire text yet. Yesterday I had the chance to read a large extract which was published in the daily edition of the local Phnom Penh Post. It was enough to understand the concept that you are trying to put into place.
It reminds me of the French military history n South East Asia, more specifically in Laos and in the North west high region of Tonkin ( a region covering the current provinces of Lai Chau, Lao Cai, Son La and Yen Bai in Vietnam).
In both places the French command deployed the GCMAs- Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés.
These groups were composed of highly trained, multi-disciplinary airborne officers and NCOs acting with local tribesmen in a very close integration and cooperation.
Their role was essentially to gather intelligence, destroy and disrupt movements and concentrations of enemy forces, prepare the ground for major operations and finally protect tribal ancestral territories.
In Laos they were highly instrumental against the Japanese during the reconquest of Laos territory in 1943, 44, 45. It was the same in the Tonkin high region.
Very unfortunately they were too few to create a real unbalance. Progressively they were lacking logistics support from the Central Command, they became rapidly exhausted due to terrain conditions and losses with no MEDEVAC capability and they finally ended completely abandoned when the Central Command decided to change its warfare. Some decided to stay and continue the fighting with the tribes; radio communications asking for replenishment were heard months after the defeat of Dien Bien Phu. Some decided to rally regular units after months spent in the jungle.
In Algeria we never reedited similar operations though we also used local people, the Harkis who were fighting along with us. History replicates and a vast majority of Harkis were also left behind us.
Major your scheme might work if it gets the support of the SOCOM, is it the correct wording, and CiC. It might work because we a huge logistics for different kind of support, because you have a huge manpower.
However you are part of a coalition, do not forget it unless you want to fight your own war. Consequently if the decision is taken to support the tribes, other forces will have to adhere to the same warfare in their zones of responsibility. Have they been briefed about this concept, I doubt for the time being.
My Commanding General in Berlin was commenting after the tragic incident in the Uzbin valley. In a nutshell his comment was that operations were ill conceived. He was strongly advocating to reinstate an Algerian concept. Spent most of the time in the field, day and certainly night, gather intelligence on Taliban movements and concentrations, do not give them respite, ambush and kill them at night along the itineraries they use. Stop using your FOBs, deploy on the ground! And so forth.
I wish you good luck Major. I hope you will keep me posted. Iwish I could be a bit younger to follow you on the treacherous tracks.
Jacques LE GUEN, Colonel Retired, Mech Infantry, Airmobile and Airborne.
Isn’t this like the CAP program in Vietnam?
Further to my comment of November 4, 2009……
BBC Radio 4’s Taking a Stand today (January 26) comprises an interview between Fergal Keane and Michael Semple who was deported from Afghanistan in December 2007.
Mr. Semple said: “It’s going to be solved through politics.”
MAJ Gant,
I am extremely grateful and enlightened by ‘One Tribe at a Time’. I was first introduced because of a holiday trip to a small town… Alamogordo, NM. I was visiting on the same street as your father who mentioned this amazing book to the people I was visiting. I am with 3rdSFG(A) and although I have been fulfilling my contributions as support to SOF; I was ecstatic to learn what REALLY works and what REALLY matters, because higher HQ doesn’t always tailor our efforts to such and has an agenda which isn’t always parallel to lower. This battle between echelons is all too familiar and persistent. However, I will be sharing this enlightening read with ALL my comrades both here and abroad, and hope it hits the mark on our ‘recommended reading list’. I anticipate requiring my analysts to read it in attempt to better grasp what truly counts, and overall impacts the efforts within Afghanistan. Furthermore, how this occupation can be more worth while not only for those doing the leg work, and participating in the tribal engagement piece… but for those similar to myself whose sole purpose is to support it, beyond a doubt understand it, and alter our all-to-common destructive “kill em all, let god sort it out’” attitude; it wont and cant and hasn’t ever worked that way.
I would like your permission to discuss your key experiences and opinions in a paper I am writing while a student in ALC right now. As analysts, we are incorporating more critical thinking components into our line of work; and with that must capture a step-back approach of adapting new ways of thinking, and letting go of the traditional biases or bandwagon downfalls. I truly believe ‘One Tribe at a Time’ can be a contagious concept which will become a model supported not only by and with the SOF environment; but within the Army as a whole. I do trust your insight and opinions and believe it can overall create the effects desired to assist and build Afghanistan from within. It will take time, and repetition and commitment (Isn’t this concept already a warrior/soldier concept abroad, so why aren’t we doing it?). I am determined as a result of reading your thoughts and experiences it’s beyond a doubt possible!
Thank you Sir for all you have shared, and best wishes in your new endeavors.
With the most respect,
SSG Angela M Roller
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