Tribal elders tell US Special Forces about their "muj days," fighting the Russians
A week ago I ran a post about two young Army captains—Jim Gant and Michael Harrison—who served in the same valley in Konar province, Afghanistan. Their service was six years apart, yet the two were linked by their bonds with a tribal chief named Noorafzhal and by a gift of honor—a shotgun that Capt. Gant and his Special Forces ODA 316 had presented to the tribal elder in August 2003. Just three weeks ago, June 2009, Noorafzhal was still showing that gun off—this time to Capt. Harrison.
This is Counterinsurgency (COIN) at its best and something equally important—positive continuity. The following is from an e-mail Capt. Harrison sent me from Konar a few days ago:
There is definitely a direct carryover of goodwill and overt support for American forces from Maj. Gant and ODA 316. During our first shura (meeting) with the elders in Mangwal [Noorafzhal’s village], we discussed the importance of working together to better their country and village. They all agreed, bringing up their past relationship with “the bearded Americans.”
Tribesmen connect man-to-man. In Mangwal in 2003, Capt. Gant and his team loved to stay up till all hours with Noorafzhal–to whom they gave the honorific nickname, Sitting Bull–listening to his stories of how he and the other tribesmen fought the Russians in the 80s. (Note, in the photo, the sketch of the topography of an ambush.)
I feel [Capt. Harrison’s e-mail continues] that the way Maj. Gant and the rest of his unit dealt with Noorafzhal helped us establish ourselves and cut down on the time required to develop the trust and relationships that yield cooperation, accurate and timely intel and buy-in from the village elders.
This sounds like a success story and it is. But the point to take note of is how accidental it all was. Capt. Gant didn’t know Capt. Harrison. There was no planned or institutionalized contact between the two officers, no handover, no collaboration. A number of other units served in the valley between their deployments. It was just luck that two such tribally-savvy officers happened to work, in different eras, with the same elders and the same tribesmen.
“Sitting Bull” still carries enormous influence [reports Capt. Harrison]. Whenever he arrives at a shura, everyone shuts up and stands up. He is the first to speak on all issues. He “allows” the sub-governor [a non-tribal post of the Afghan government] to assert his power and is careful not to circumvent or marginalize the district leadership. But it is apparent that the respect and power is still there. He could definitely put armed men into the field if he wanted to.
Donald Vandergriff, a retired Army officer and military leadership maverick, asks:
What would have happened if Capt. Harrison and his unit had overlapped with Maj. Gant and his team? It would have made the good situation that Capt. Harrison describes even better. In today’s personnel system, people are seen as individual replacement parts. The system does not take into account the intangibles of unit cohesion, trust and competence. The only way we can successfully wage this war is through the building of professionalism and trust.
To that, I would add the building of ongoing and uninterrupted bonds with village and tribal leaders.
In his book The Sling and The Stone, Col. T.X. Hammes makes a related point:
The weakness of our current personnel system is that it is a hundred years old and grooms people to run organizations based on concepts from another century. Unfortunately, that is not the only weakness. The bureaucratic model itself is a major problem. In this model, “career development” requires frequent moves and a wide variety of duties. The idea is to ensure that every person has the broad range of skills necessary to function at the top of the organization. It focuses on creating generalists rather than experts … [The typical officer’s career pattern] consists of a series of short (one to three years) postings in a wide variety of jobs … They are, in effect, amateurs by profession. They never spend enough time in any one job to become an expert.
How many critical Afghan-to-American relationships are we destroying by failing to rotate or redeploy outstanding officers back into Areas of Operation (AOs) where they have successfully bonded with tribal leaders and elders? Officers like Jim Gant and Michael Harrison should be working together. Their tours should be overlapping or tag-teamed so that tribal leaders don’t have to reconnect with new faces each time around, but can deepen and broaden already-established bonds with men and warriors they know and trust.
I’m certain that addressing this situation is on Gen. McChrystal’s to-do list. I applaud it. And one further thought.
Maybe the clean-shaven look is overrated.
17 Comments
Steven,
Great stuff. My experience was as a Marine platoon commander in Somalia and our CO worked against the tactical thinking by cleaning up streets, scrounging lumber from the UN compound to give away to our AO, etc. It paid enormous dividends.
Hadn’t thought about the personnel/career path problem in this light but also see the benefits of longevity. Transfers to the business world, too, and I’ll now keep that better in mind with my people (www.S3.com).
Thanks, I’ll keep reading. Jack
I don’t know the two gentlemen in question but it is likely that if they are exceptional in the above role they were exceptional in what they did before that. Fortunately a keen personnel manager did not lock them into logistics when they were outstanding XOs and S4s, or into training when they excelled as cadre or OCs. The system benefits from fortuitous accidents, and the equally likely mistakes are inevitably rectified.
Yes. The current system is frustrating. The critique of the personnel system creating generalists rather than experts is true. The advantages of enhanced continuity are obvious.
But… you cannot optimize for everything. I doubt it was by design but the current system does avoid the long term institutional sclerosis, empire building and turf wars that plague organizations where roles and responsibilities are endlessly refined and narrowed. The current system does create adaptable leaders—ones who won’t be obsessed with re-fighting the last war—at the cost of waste and friction. All systems, human or mechanical, require its designers to trade various efficiencies. I think our system today is pretty close to right. There is probably room for more commander flexibility in a time of war. Technology, properly applied (today it is not) can definitely ameliorate the worst outcomes. Those are improvements around the edges. I would love to hear of an alternative that does not require its implementors (the actual personnel decision makers) to possess above average capabilities.
No, I do not think the system achieves optimal results, but I think it may avoid the worst.
Mr. Pressfield,
I’m an Army Chaplain in an SF unit. Heading to Afghanistan in the future (won’t say when), so I’m glad to keep up with your site as mission preparation. Have read Killing Rommel (and recommended it to many) and Gates of Fire. Heard you on Hugh Hewitt as well–which lead me to Killing Rommel. Thanks for your work.
Chaplain Lowthian
Really enjoyed your videos, very graphic but accurate portrayals of a war that can’t be won. The Soviets sent in their army and Spetsnaz special forces, fought the Taliban for 10 years, and still couldn’t beat the Taliban. Of course, our CIA was kind enough to train and equip this army of fanatics who now are fighting US. Who exactly at the CIA was in charge of this fiasco?
Now, we are asking the US Marines to drive the Taliban out. But, strangely, Obama has asked these Jarheads not to fire in civilian areas. Wow, if I was a Taliban leader, I sure would want to hide out and place my mortars, snipers, and rocket launchers in a civilian village. And, the Marines are in the valleys and the enemy has the high ground. Gosh, another cluster f..k!
I spent 20 years as an officer in Naval Intelligence, two tours in Viet Nam in combat gathering tactical intel, mission planning, and catching and interrogating Congs and NVA soldiers. Afganistan will be another Nam as Obama and his merry men are clueless when it comes to fighting a war. The enemy will wait us out since Muslims, while terrible regular soliders, make great guerilla fighters and have lots of patience. After we leave Iraq, Iran will invite itself in to maintain security and the UN won’t say squat.
Nice, but nothing new. The best work in Afghanistan was done early by properly trained and educated Special Operations Forces (beards and all). In both Iraq and Afghanistan, we send troops trained to break things–a necessary skill in winning conventional wars–into COIN situations and tell them to figure it out of the ground. Want to win in Afghanistan? Put US SOF in charge of operations with coalition SOF and conventional troops in support. They should work hand-in-glove with CIA, Dept of State, USAID and, most importantly, the Afghan government under a clear strategy (and authority) from the President. Sounds simple, but we continue to get it wrong.
I spent 3 years in Saudi Arabia in the late 70’s as the Kingdom was making the surface shift to the modern world. More than half of Ryadh was still made of mud. Jedda was as if in a time machine.
My Bible was Lawrence and Bell. I spoke no Arabic, but worked hard on the lessons of this being a formal society where men spoke to men.
For my first year, I would show up at the mazlis of the big men and just sit and drink coffee. Because I showed up often and behaved (kept my mouth shut until spoken to) after a while, I would be asked questions. Usually about things that I had no knowledge of. I was being tested for being a caring person. Over time, I would move up the side of the group and get closer to the man. More often I would be asked my opinion. I knew I was “In” when the Coffee men would give me a smile of recognition.
I had a great boss – an English aristocrat – who understood all of this implicitly – his core advice was to listen for the “Test”. He told me that at some point I would be given a hint of a desire – not for a bribe but to tell me about something that meant a lot to the “man”. The unaware or the inattentive would miss it – it would be subtle.
It was the next summer, Wimbledon was in full swing. My client and I were chatting about tennis. He had been educated in England and sounded more English than I did. Then it came. He said how sad he was that it was so hard to get tickets for centre court. It was just a passing thought in a long conversation and was not spoken as a question or a request.
I sense that this was it, the test, but had no idea of what to do. So I asked Chris. He laughed and went over to the trading desk – “Rob” he said “Centre Court Tickets are traded on the LSE” I go back onto the line with Hisham and told him that he could buy a pair of tickets for this price – he said yes immediately.
This was my “shotgun” moment. It was not even a “gift” – it was an act of paying attention. Of showing that I cared.
As a consequence, I too was adopted, I was in my late 20’s by one of the leading Jedda families, the Alireza’s and this tribal connection became my safety net and my entree.
Consequently I had a very different experience in the Kingdom than most of my competitors. Not only did I build a great business there, but I felt as if I was going home whenever I arrived there. I lived in the local world rather than the bubble. The irony would be when I took down senior partners of my firm to the country. All the attention would be paid to me – after all who were these men whom they did not know.
I miss it very much.
I think that your idea of senior officers staying out in Afghanistan for maybe 10 -15 years is essential. You surely have to know and love the country that you are tasked to work in. Not just at the senior level as I found out. Would it be impossible for a young American man to make his career the connector? It took me less than 2 years to gain the trust and I did not speak Arabic. 3-5 years as a Captain or WO spread all over the country would anchor the mission – there would always be a hand over and a legacy.
Thank you Mr Pressfield – for all your books and insight and for this forum